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Managing “Mega- Daguos” in the Global Society of XXIst Century

Madalina Virginia ANTONESCU¹

Abstract

The present paper starts from analyzing the conceptual roots of the “daguo” term, as it is used in the Chinese studies of international relations; we’ll introduce into discussion the new concept of “mega-daguo-s”, as referring to supra-entities (political or civilization), as a kind of new trans-state and super-state actors, one of them being of continental and trans-continental dimensions and we’ll try to define some of their features and importance for 21st global society. The third part of the paper will be focused on the concrete types of mega-daguo-s, that are in full process of re-composition and emergence, connecting this new reality to concepts as “global governance” or “harmonious governance”.

Keywords: great powers, mega-daguo, civilization, global governance.

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1. Introduction: 21st Century – Century of Rising Mega-daguos and New Challenges for the Westphalian World

The beginning of the 21st century brings *a series of entirely new geopolitical challenges for the classical geopolitical thinking*, thus generating the necessity to define new geopolitical maps, depending on *new concepts, paradigms and theories, specific to a post- Westphalian world*, a world in full process of globalization, which has *effects even on the types of actors*, taking shape starting from this moment.

Therefore, it is important that, *when new actors specific to the 21st century globalist world are defined and classified* (a world detached from the current operation methods and geopolitical plans, which start from the premise of the Westphalian world and of the classic relation principles applied among nation-states), we start from the interpretation *in a new context* (globalist, in full process of *geopolitical reorganization, based on principles different from the Westphalian principles*) of phrases with innovative content.

Apparently, these phrases (global governance, harmonious world, dialogue of civilizations, conflict between the civilizations, daguo, durable development, global world) *seem to have exhausted or fully revealed their content, without any surprises at theoretical or geopolitical level*. In reality, in the globalist world subject to the impact of various factors (economic, social, cultural, political, military), such phrases are also pushed towards redefining and reoperation, at least in theory. One of the phrases on which we chose to focus in the present paper is the “*relation between daguo*” phrase.

We will begin by *explaining the initial meaning* of the above-mentioned phrase (from the Chinese perspective of the international relations, to which the use of the term *daguo* belongs) and continue by *identifying geopolitical directions and movements of the new actors*, different from everything that existed so far in the Westphalian political world, actors that act on the basis of principles and rules different from those of the states, actors for which the states are simple components, parts in enormous geopolitical structures, whose geopolitical management is made only at global level and only based on a set of regulations specific to these actors (truly *global actors*).

These new actors, which *we try to identify, at least in general lines, based on certain projects, visions and trends of geopolitical evolution*, can be compared to gigantic Leviathans, able to survive and act in a global world, in which small identities tend to disappear, in which only colossal may have a chance to survive.

“The global world” of the 21st century appears to be a world of geopolitical colossi, created without necessarily following rules of cultural similitude, based on precise geopolitical interests. This world is a space of actors which exceeded the classic concept of daguo, i.e. of “great powers” (as large nation-states or even proto-federations of states, such as EU).

The world in question is a world of mega-powers, a world of post-Westphalian colossi, moving and acting based on their own rules, for which the established term of “great powers” becomes ridiculous, obsolete, incapable of grasping their civilization potential, the huge economic, military or political force, the colossal geopolitical vision and action, developed by these mastodons.

If currently we note non-institutionalized or post-institutionalized relational aspects among the great powers (such as the *G-7 dialogue groups*), in the world of geopolitical mastodons, these types of relations (quite flexible, which do not rigorously follow the functioning manner of the westphalian world, based on the principle of cooperation among all the states, as all the states are considered equal in rights and sovereign entities) *become ridiculous, obsolete, as much as the term “great powers” and everything related to how the phrase “great powers relating” is currently construed.*

In time, towards the second half of the 21st century, we may witness the crystallization of types of relations between mega-daguos, based on cooperation *exclusively between them* (not between mega-daguo and a great power or a group of powers of the G-7 type or united in a political proto-federation), but also *between the mega-daguo and entirely different types of actors specific to the global world*, as a post-westphalian world (e.g. *relations between the mega-daguo and the federations of metropolises or megalopolises* (Griffiths, 2005, pp. 310-311), as legal and political entities, distinct from states and nations).

The world in which the mega-daguos of the 21st century will act is revealed as a geopolitical, legal, cultural and military space, *completely different from everything functioning at the beginning of the 21st century*. It is a *profoundly urbanized world, which will witness a rise of the great cities, metropolises and megalopolises*, their economic, cultural and political momentum, doubled by a *privatization of their defence systems* (their own city armies, either under public administration or using mercenaries – private armies, for the protection of the cities), *cities will become autonomous* (especially from the economic viewpoint), in relation the other spaces belonging to certain states weakened by wars and no longer capable to define their reaction strategies, for the challenges of the global world, as a post-state world.

The relations between the mega-daguos and the urban giants will be regulated by the norms of a global law, entirely different from what currently functions as international law. New forms of cosmopolitanism and transnational identities will occur,

generated by the occurrence and ascension of these new actors. *Citizens of the fortified megalopolises, which are economically autonomous from the state, will negotiate for the citizenship of the mega-daguo* (if these new actors will still consider necessary to borrow something from the tradition of the states and to assume a transnational political dimension, which is supra-national at the same time, such as the citizenship).

2. Concept of “Mega-daguo” in the 21st Century: Exceeding the Classic International Relations and Entering the World of Trans-regional and Global Relations

The roots of the complex concept which we propose in the present paper, as being a major concept in the endeavour to explore the world of global and transnational politics, in the 21st century (“mega-daguo”) are found in the analyses of external policy, regarding China and its relations to the great powers. Thus, in a study elaborated by David Lampton (2014), on the analysis of the phrase “*A new type of relations among the great powers, in the 21st century*” (*xinxing daguo guanxi*), we note that the term “daguo” is used as a synonym for “great powers” or “large countries”, acting as such on the scene of the 21st century. This phrase was used by the president of China, Xi Jinping, to define the relations between China and SUA, being presented in a speech delivered in Washington, in 2012.

However, *the world after the mid 21st century* will be, as much as its politics (global, transnational, urban), different from the world of the early 21st century. If we can currently use the term “daguo”, which we equate with the traditional term “great powers”, some identifiable in the international politics (especially China, the USA, considered for outlining the phrase “*A new type of relations among the great powers, in the 21st century*”, proposed by the president of China), *in the future, it is possible that the international political scene become the field of action for certain types of global mega-actors (transcontinental or pluri-continental), exceeding the current sense of “daguo”, through a multitude of features*. In this version, it is preferable that the global actors changing the face of the 21st century world, be identified as “mega-daguo”.

3. Distinction between the Concept of “Mega-daguo” and the Concept of “Great Power”, “Empire” and “Civilization”

We must distinguish between the concept of “mega daguo” and the classic concept of “great power”, as in most perspectives present in the

study of international relations, especially in the realistic ones, the latter means “*a state or states* at the top of the list, in terms of their military and economic capabilities (...) wherefrom a hierarchical structure of the world policy is generated, formed of great powers, middle powers, small powers and micro-states” (Evans, Newham, 2001, pp. 219-220). Besides a military and economic capability able to maintain a status of superiority over several states, the “great powers”, *in the contemporary sense of the term* (connected to the features of a global world) are *states* which have global interests and the capacity to impose these interests in the global agenda, even to formulate the global agenda of talks and which have the political will to impose the fulfilment of these global interests (Evans, Newham, 2001, p. 220).

In another perspective, *the concept of “great powers” is expressly connected to the concept of “state”* (“the great powers are the most powerful *states* in the international system”, “the most active in the international system”, “the most active, especially at military level, being able to project their power at vast distances”, as well as “the most able to cause security dilemmas and, therefore, to become target of the aggression of other states”, “are some of the richest states in the system”, “own a great internal economy”, “are primary actors in creating and maintaining most of the international organizations of the world”). At the same time, the “great powers” have “large territorial dimensions, the highest populations, the largest economies and, generally, the highest levels of internal wealth”, “they are disproportionately involved in the international commerce and they are the first source of direct foreign investments” (Griffiths, 2005, pp. 349-350).

However, concerning this traditional approach on a “great power”, *a mega-daguo has a varied structure* (states, non-state actors, metropolises and megalopolises with autonomy from the states, with legal personality, federalized regions, confederations of states, supranational entities in consolidated strategic partnerships with other federations of states, at continental or trans-oceanic level, groups of states and peoples covering territories of continental, trans-oceanic or even trans-continental dimensions, with various forms of political organization). Despite this varied structure, *the mega-daguo creates its own bureaucracy, able to express its political will in relation to other mega-daguo, that of a global actor able to shape the scene of the 21st century global world* (a world completely different from our contemporary world, in transition towards globalism, still dominated by strong westphalian perspectives). *This new global actor has its own institutions* (trans-continental, trans-oceanic) *develop coherent, unique external strategies and policies, superior to its*

components (even though, in the first stages of evolution, it can fall under the domination of a decision-making nucleus of certain great powers in its structure). *A characteristic of the mega-daguo is its capacity to act clearly, according to its own will, superior to the great powers in its structure, a will distinct from them* (this being the point in which the mere stage of military alliance or international inter-governmental alliance is exceeded, followed by the stage of actual forming of a political colossus with its own political will, of trans-continental or trans-oceanic dimensions).

Mega-daguo must not be mistaken for an “empire”, concept which has its limits, according to the *traditional definitions of the empire* (“a group of territories independent from the economic, military and political point of view, from a metropolis which exploits them systematically, usually conquered by military force”; “formal administration of various peoples, by a central/metropolitan power”; “entity born from the claim to rule and interest in exploiting others”; “entity characterized mainly by military conquering and colonizing – although not all the empires throughout history were based on a systematic process of colonization lato sensu (Griffiths, 2005, pp. 206-207)”, some being focused only on destroying the conquered cultures or plundering them). In relation to the empires (according to the above-mentioned perspective), the mega-daguos are different by the fact that they represent *political mega-entities of trans-continental or trans-oceanic dimensions, which can be incorporated in several empires, beside great powers as such – not included in the empires forming a mega-daguo – beside a superpower, medium and small states, non-state actors*, such as megalopolises with their own autonomy and legal personality, in relation to the states of origin; in addition, they can incorporate *networks of metropolises with autonomy, international organizations etc.*)

As compared to the classic empires (a metropolis/decision-making imperial nucleus and a group of territories conquered by the military forces and maintained in a colonial relation of structural dependence on the metropolis), *mega-daguo may include several empires, several civilization pools, thus becoming extremely composite structures, with their own clear political will, in relation to any of their components* (reached in the climax stage, after a stage in which the will of a mega-daguo is represented by the will of a single great power or a group of great powers or of an incorporated empire).

The formation of mega-daguo is not necessarily based on military conquests or exclusively on a relation of colonization, as much as it is based on the creation of a *relation of protection over its components* (from the creation of

the military defence against the external aggressors, to a protection of the continental or trans-oceanic identity, against civilization-related aggressions caused by other mega-daguos), in relation to the challenges of globalization, including the challenges of other mega-daguos.

The creation of a mega-daguo determines the occurrence of other mega-daguo, as a response of the states and civilizations, of the empires and megalopolises (emancipated from under the guardianship of nation states, which by mid 21st century are no longer capable of providing the guarantee of prosperity and security) to the formation of a continental or trans-oceanic mastodon, by which they feel threatened (hence the realistic paradigm of clash between mega-daguo, in a global world in which small identities disappear or in which they cannot be protected other than by joining colossal political structures, seems to be most appropriate for “continuity of history” or at least, from one of its perspectives).

Through the creation of the first mega-daguo, the global world of the 21st century becomes a world confronted with a new, special security dilemma, different from the occurrence of a super-power (a world rather attracting the paradigm of multipolarity, of perception by other centres of power and regions, of the necessity, as a reaction, to form other mega-daguo, with which it joins and rules the global game of power, turned into a game of the trans-continental, trans-oceanic actors, different from the game of the current great powers.

It is a dialogue or a confrontation between colossi, in which the nation-states (even though they are great powers) are no longer relevant (they are only relevant in the preliminary stage, in which they temporarily manage to rule and direct the mega-daguo they joined, according to their political will, elaborated at trans-continental and/or trans-oceanic scale). We are talking here about trans-continental and trans-oceanic identities, about multi-continental or continental identities, which exceed the logic of the sovereign state and of the equality among states, requiring the occurrence of other paradigms and concepts, which explain the new global environment of the second half of the 21st century.

Similarly to the empires, the mega-daguo are artificial political entities, created systematically or even suddenly (unlike the civilizations, which look more like uniform civilization structures, slowly formed throughout history, despite the different and numerous cultures and ethnic groups included). A mega-daguo can be the result of a summit among various state and non-state actors (even religious cults, churches, and transnational trade union or ecologist movements, transnational companies, metropolises and megalopolises which want to be protected from massive waves of migrations or from global financial crises); it

can be the result of *the political agreement to transform an international organization based on multilateralism (ASEAN, the Shanghai Organization, NATO)*; it can be the result of *extending and consolidating, eventually transforming a strategic partnership between two economic blocks or between a developed economic block and economically emerging regions or developing regions*; it can be the result of *the formation of several empire and their union in a gigantic supra-imperial political construction*; it can be the result of the *merger between two federations of states or among original entities, such as the EU, and strategic partnerships with trans-oceanic federations of states*; it can be the result of *ordering the global world based on a bipolar relation* (the occurrence of a continental mega-daguo determines the occurrence, as a reaction, of a trans-oceanic mega-daguo), as well as of other global strategic movements.

Mega-daguo can be encountered *both in the paradigm of a bipolar world and a multipolar world. A mega-daguo can represent the very “end of history”, as “world political structure/political regime”* (when it becomes the sole super-empire, unrivalled, *after the confrontation with other mega-daguo and their break-down, after a civilization cataclysm or through systematic, strategic blocking of the formation of certain rival mega-daguo*).

But, unlike the empires, mega-daguo are not created exclusively and inevitably by *military conquer* (a classic feature of the empire), as much as *by*: political will of the great powers, of a great power, of the strategic partnership, consolidated and transformed in a close relation of imperial cooperation, within a mega-daguo, between two or three power centres.

The formation of the 21st century mega-daguo can be closer to the type of formation and expansion of the *current postmodern empires: legal economic formation and expansion – through agreements of association, of strengthened cooperation, of adhering; by attracting the peripheries due to a formula of success; through a seducing continental or multi-continental political process, which is prosperous and safe (space of freedom, security and justice0; by exploiting the cultural similarities among the peoples and creation of a continental/trans-oceanic identity, able to provide prestige and protection to these peoples, in the fragmented and chaotic world of globalization, defined through massive migration values, resulting in an inter-connection and, implicitly, in tensor relations among the areas of the various civilizations)*.

The creation of mega-daguo does not necessarily entail military conquering, territorial aggression over other territories (as it happens with the empires), as much as *free participation of the state and non-state actors in a common project, identification of a set of values, inspirations, common interests* (protection and projection of progress, prosperity).

In the same manner, the mid-21st century postmodern mega-daguo cannot apply a rule encountered in the majority of empires (*colonization of the conquered territories*), they are more likely to be based on a *cooperation* between the decision-making nucleus and the other components (*for reasons concerning the legality and legitimacy before the incorporated populations*), on *relatively equalitarian grounds, consulting all the components, associating them at various levels of governance*.

A postmodern mega-daguo appears *more as a multi-level type of governance* (close to current postmodern entities, such as the EU), particularly to ensure its internal stability, *by associating its components, at various degrees and levels, to the decision-making process*. Only the *key domains* (security, external politics, currency, control on the external borders etc.) are under *the decisional monopoly of a proprietary power centre*, granting that mega-daguo *a unique, firm will, coherence and a firm action, in the relation with other mega-daguo, ensuring its capacity to project its power, at global level*.

In addition, a mega-daguo *must not be mistaken for the concept of “civilization”* (starting only from one of the definitions of “civilization”, provided by realistic authors, such as Huntington, in his work ‘Clash of Civilizations’), according to which “civilization” represents the “highest stage of the cultural group of people and *the widest level of cultural identity, reached by the human beings*, which allows the differentiation between the human species and other species. It is defined by the language, history, religion, habits, institutions and a subjective self-identification of the human beings (Griffiths, 2005, pp. 76-77).

Ethnic groups are a narrower concept than the civilization groups, since a single civilization can include a multitude of ethnic groups (Griffiths, 2005, p. 77). *In our opinion, civilizations do not represent political actors* equipped with their own coherent, clear will, distinct from that of the cultures and states in their area. Secondly, we must note that a civilization *does not have a well-defined and rigorous state or ethnic structure*, because the states, regions, ethnic groups included *are in a constant state of movement, self-defining* (including the temporal, historical viewpoint) *as belonging more or less to the respective civilization*.

Since it is not an actor of the global world (at least for the time being), a civilization *cannot produce a structure of political governance* of the peoples and ethnic groups, in its areal, *does not have a specific bureaucratic system, distinct from its components* (national bureaucracies), *or the penalization instruments or proprietary norms*, to impose its will over the populations in its structure. In addition, civilizations cannot be political actors assimilated with the mega-daguo, because *they do not present visions, strategic projects to be assumed and*

implemented by a decision-making nucleus, by great powers or by a group of states included in its structure.

In addition, *we must not mistake a mega-daguo with political entities of the EU type, with proto-federations of states* although, for the present world (in full process of transition from the Westphalian order, to the post-state order), EU can be considered *an entity announcing the forming of the future mega-daguo* (a proto-mega-daguo), from many points of view.

From the viewpoint of the term “*empire*”, mega-daguo can adapt to the *hierarchical* shape of the classic empire or they can borrow *soft semi-hierarchical* forms of power and operation, combined with political elements, based on *the logic of the network* (equality among the members, dialogue, autonomy among the members of the network and own capacity of acting and deciding, for each “political cell” included – also see the “neo-medieval empire”). Therefore, *we must not mistake the mega-daguo with the empires, which can be only one of the multiple forms that these new actors might take in the post-Westphalian future.* If they took this shape of empire, we might say that they would be defined as *super-empires, very close to the universal empire or the mega-empire (empires spread over several continents).*

Unlike the “*universal empire*”, *built by a superpower or by a group of great powers, in a distinct civilization* (for example, the Occidental-European civilization), the mega-daguos formed according to the imperial model (in this version) are entities superior to the great power; they are *transnational and continental entities* (without strictly respecting “the geographic boundaries” defining the continents; they rather redefine them, in a *geopolitical sense, specific to their own visions*) or *multi-continental entities*, whose number and competition and cooperation relations are distinct from the relations of certain classic historic empires and from those of the 20th century and current great powers.

Also, we cannot mistake the mega-daguos with the “civilization structures”, because the civilizations (according to Huntington’s theory) continue to not be considered *political actors eo ipso*, i.e. entities capable of developing a coherent, specific politics, their own strategy, defined on the basis of political factors, through distinct political institutions (such as the Commission of Occidental-European Civilization) and accomplished by a specific diplomacy. Not even Europe, defined from the civilization viewpoint as “EU” reached the threshold to becoming a coherent political actor, from the viewpoint of *external policy as policy of a specific civilization structure, superior and distinct* from the external policies of the member states (today, we witness a co-existence of the external policies of the member

states and a *crystallization* of an external policy of the EU, only after the Lisbon stage).

Thus, from this viewpoint, *civilizations* cannot be considered political actors, since they do not have their own institutions (civilization-representative, distinct from the institutions of the states included in the respective civilization), or *their own officers* to enforce at trans-national level (*in the area of the same civilization*) norms, strategies and policies decided at the top, by the “politicians of the respective civilizations” (decision-making factors *of the civilization structure, as such*, therefore superior to the nation). Moreover, we must consider that *there is no universal valid document, anywhere* (acknowledged by all the states forming the civilizations) on *the number, type of civilizations in the political world of the early 21st century, on the quality of these civilizations of being political subjects different from the state*, of making decisions accepted by (or imposed to) the state, *or on the exact perimeters (boundaries) among civilizations* (with mixed areas, in which civilizations interconnect, which should have another political regime, specific, distinct – if the civilizations were coherent political actors).

Concerning the mega-daguos, they are entities *different* from the “civilization-representative structures”, as the first can be created through the will of several great powers and of the medium and small states (sharing the vision of these great powers and wanting to join their policy of building a mega-daguo), unlike the “civilizations”, which have a *historical* existence, *sometimes millenary*, which be confronted with a single *generating and illustrative* nation or which are currently reduced to *a pool of states, on a territory inferior* to the one occupied at the climax moment.

We must however also take into account the possibility that, in the 21st century, certain *mega-daguo with mixed composition, resulting from certain mixed political or civil wills* (belonging both to state actors and to new non-state actors, such as the politicized, militarized and fortified mega-cities, autonomous from the rest of the former state territories and from other cities) form. Belonging to a mega-daguo may give a feeling of enhancing safety in the uncertain world of the 21st century, for all types of actors (state actors or otherwise).

Mega-daguos *are not federations of nation states*, cooperating among each other, on equal and sovereign terms; they are rather the reflection of two or several *unusual combinations of wills and interests accepted in common by the participants, post-state and state actors* (which will last longer in the respective world), since the respective moment (second half of the 21st century, a

temporal benchmark which signifies overcoming the order based on equal and sovereign nation-states). It is less likely that a single great power (in the sense current construed, that of “nation-state” or “federation of nation-states”, as a consolidated EU) be able to form a mega-daguo (which is not mistaken for the universal empire of a super-power, or for a state super-power).

The *decision-making nucleus of a mega-daguo*, in the second half of the 21st century, can be formed of the *representatives of mega-cities* participating in such superstructure, from *representatives of great powers* (state or federal), *officers independent* from any actors included in a mega-daguo, which *exclusively represent the interests of mega-daguo as such*, according to a clear vision, specific to the respective mega-daguo, not to its components, taken piece by piece.

Unlike the *civilizations* (here, rather closer to empires), mega-daguos are capable of (and one of their purposes is that of) defining a *clear political existence*, acting as *distinct political actors in the political world of the 21st century*, generating a political will, their own political strategies and following their own geopolitical vision. In this sense, the structure of a mega-daguo is a *political one from the start* (although we must take into consideration the fact that politics, as we understand it at the beginning of the 21st century, *will no longer be the same with the senses of making politics and acting politically by the half of the 21st century*, in a world of other actors and in which the nation-state lost its pre-eminence and universality).

Mega-daguos can be organized based on a *teleocratic model of rule* (decision-making factors selected only from the state components, not from the components of the major actors – *great continental powers, continental megalopolises*), *thalassocratic* (ruling factors exclusively selected from the mega-daguo components, which are great *thalassocratic powers, either states, or megalopolises with power and influence over several seas and/or oceans*) or based on a *mixed model* (factors of the mega-daguo, selected or appointed by components with power or influence over the continents and seas and oceans), where a mega-daguo is designed to act and impose its vision and geopolitics.

Mega-daguos can be organized based on the model of *technocratic or bureaucratic ruling*, or based on other model (*collective plutocratic models or classic-imperial monarchic models*, a feature borrowed from the history of old empires, or *mixed ruling, with representatives of the mega-cities and bureaucrats of the mega-daguos*). It is less likely (but not entirely excluded) to see an organization based on *authentic democratic principles* in such colossal entities (trans-continental or

multi-continental), which might create blockages in the decision-making process, a formalization of the democratic decision and it would create major vulnerabilities in action, in relation to the other mega-daguo organized alter-democratic (in a world of globalization, as well as of alter-globalization, a world in movement, fluctuating, attempting to find its direction, in a new type of balance of power, which will be the balance among the mega-daguo).

In addition, *we must make a distinction between the mega-daguo and the concept of “pan-ideas”* (Simileanu, 2010, p. 2017), which represent “cardinal ideas, unifying, organizing the life of the people into extended, true spaces, mental maps setting certain cultural references, which we use to regard, evaluate and understand the world.” The pan-ideas are visions projected by an ethnic group or nation, in a geopolitical plane, and they regard the ideas about “its legitimate expansion territory”. The mega-daguos are already political actors having and developing politics at continental or transcontinental scale and, from a certain perspective, they are superior to the pan-ideas (pan-Teutonism, pan-Slavism, pan-Ottomanism, pan-Orthodoxy etc.), since they represent clearly defined political forms, with political action and power (in all the senses, from the hard to the soft sense), identifiable as belonging to their decision-making nuclei; the mega-daguos represent global political actors, not mental maps, like the pan-ideas. The mega-daguos are actors which can project their specific vision in the geopolitical reality, a vision which may include several continents or seas and oceans, therefore it cannot be solely specific to a single ethnic group or nation. The geopolitical vision of the mega-daguos includes territories at continental level, transoceanic or transcontinental level, without being limited by what a single nation or actor within – be it preeminent in relation to other actors – considers to be “its legitimate space of expansion”. The space of expansion of a mega-daguo is significantly superior to the pan-idea projected by one of its components (state, federation of states, state-turned city etc.)

4. Management of the “Mega-daguos”. Principles of Coexistence between the Mega-daguos

Back to the original paradigm (“*A new type of relations among the great powers/ daugo, in the 21st century*”), as understood by the contemporary political analysts (regarding the relation for which it was initially phrased, i.e. the relation between China and the USA) (Lampton, 2014), we note that, based

on this paradigm, a series of political relations were identified, relations which are close to another major paradigm (“dialogue between civilizations”): thus, currently, the relation between the two contemporary daguo (China and the USA), as a “new type of relation for the 21st century” is meant to be built on several pillars, such as:

- Mutual understanding and strategic trust
- Mutual respect for the key-interests of the other;
- Cooperation for mutual benefit;
- Strengthening the cooperation and coordination, in the international affairs and in global issues (Lampton, 2014).

Starting from these aspects, China intends to extend “the new type of relation”, with all the great powers of the 21st century (the current great powers or daguo), proposing that the “dialogue between daguo” paradigm be used.

All these strategic lines of political thinking of the global actors, at the beginning of the 21st century must be considered and used as grounds for building the framework-relations among the future global actors, which will dominate the world, starting with the second half of the 21st century.

Especially when outlining a global regulation framework (norms or policies) of the relations among the mega-daguo, in the 21st century, in our opinion, the positive aspects must be taken into consideration, aspects presented in the current view of the “new types of relations among the daguo”, at the beginning of the 21st century, i.e. the aspects pleading for *applying the paradigm of “dialogue among the mega-daguo”*, rather than for the realistic paradigm of “inevitable conflict among the mega-daguo”, which may have catastrophic consequences for the entire planet. Thus, the guidelines for the relations among the daguo would be the following:

- Principle of dialogue among the mega-daguo and of solving the differences, through peaceful methods; interdiction on waging a war among the mega-daguo;
- Principle of common interest and principle of preventing conflicts among the mega-daguo: identifying a common agenda of issues in managing the global affairs, in a peaceful and preventing manner;
- Predictability of mega-daguo behaviours and strategic trust;
- Principle of mutually beneficial cooperation and harmonization with the principle of cooperation for the benefit of humanity, in order to preserve the terrestrial ecosystem and ensuring a high quality of life;

- Observing and developing the global law and, within its framework, the field of human rights; developing the rights and responsibilities of the human being, as citizen of the planet;
- Identifying and fulfilling a set of responsibilities for the mega-daguo, when maintaining the global stability and peace among the mega-daguo;
- Action of the mega-daguo at global level, only by observing the principles of preserving planetary peace and cooperation in good-faith, with the other mega-daguo;
- Creation of global institutions, accepted by all the mega-daguo, for arbitrage and mediation among them, in case of disputes in various issues.

5. Conclusions

As a conclusion, we can say that, as of the second half of the 21st century, the mega-daguos will clash from the viewpoint of their geopolitical visions and especially from the point of their visions of the global world, as this giants can function in a state of relative harmony (with the term “harmonious global world” redefined, from the perspective of these new actors), when determining the elements of common interest and bridges between their different visions of the organization and administration of the 21st century world.

In our opinion, *the relative state of harmony* among these colossi (each of them with the tendency to gain global power) will be achievable ***only with their strict, rigorous functioning, based on a Charter of Peaceful Coexistence among the Mega-Daguos***, ordered on the basis of the paradigm of “*dialogue among the mega-daguo*”.

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